Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund by Dore, Michael
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 57 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-1-1982
Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste
Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund
Michael Dore
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Dore, Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund, 57 Notre Dame L. Rev. 260
(1982).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol57/iss2/2
The Standard of Civil Liability for Hazardous Waste
Disposal Activity: Some Quirks of Superfund
Michael Dore *
I. Introduction
Environmental tragedies involving hazardous wastes' have
prompted calls for a comprehensive federal program to regulate haz-
ardous waste disposal. 2 While some states had extensive legislative
schemes for waste disposal, 3 the absence of regulation in many states
and the multistate nature of the problem have led to substantial fed-
eral efforts in this area. After some rather tentative initial efforts,
4
Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (Superfund).5 Superfund
provides for both a comprehensive regulatory scheme for, and a reve-
nue procedure to fund federal responses to, releases of hazardous sub-
stances. 6 The comprehensive scope of this federal legislation will
result in more precise liability standards for certain enumerated toxic
waste disposal activities. Superfund will also limit the application of
federal rules of decision to those relatively few aspects of hazardous
waste control and disposal to which federal liability standards are
uniquely suited.
In City offMilwaukee v. llinois, 7 the Supreme Court of the United
States recently considered the impact of federal pollution statutes
* Attorney, Airco Inc., Montvale, N.J.; B.A., Amherst College, 1972; J.D., Rutgers
School of Law (Newark), 1975.
1 Recent examples of such tragedies include Love Canal, see M. BROWN, LAYING
WASTE; THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY TOXIC CHEMICALS (1980). See generaly Costle &
Beck, Attack on Hazardous Wastes: Turning Back The Toxic Tide, 9 CAP. L. REV. 425 (1980);
Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and The Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762,
1762 (1974) ("Recently mounting concern with . . . the methods used to dispose of waste
products has led to a proliferation of state and federal legislation designed to preserve the
environment.").
2 See 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 2797, 2797-2801 (Dec. 15, 1981).
3 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25117-25611 (West Supp. 1981); New
Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.1 to .33 (West
Supp. 1981).
4 See text accompanying notes 23-33 infra.
5 Pub. L. No. 96-510, tit. III, §§ 1-308, 94 Stat. 2767 (to be codified at 46 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657) (hereinafter Superfund).
6 See text accompanying notes 55-85 infla.
7 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
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upon the federal common law of nuisance. The Court noted that the
earlier application of this federal common law of nuisance to issues of
interstate water pollution was premised upon the absence of a federal
statutory scheme governing this area.8 The Court held that the en-
actment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 9 supplanted any
previously available federal common law remedies.' 0 While this
holding came in the context of an analysis of federal water pollution
regulation, the Court's reasoning is equally applicable to all federal
common law environmental remedies. 1
Federal common law has allowed federal courts to become in-
volved in many areas of pollution control,' 2 including hazardous
waste disposal.' 3 This federal involvement, however, has sometimes
been an intrusion into an area of uniquely state concern.' 4 A federal
court applying a federal common law of nuisance is often ill-
equipped to resolve issues arising in hazardous waste litigation. Be-
cause hazardous waste activities often have a direct impact upon
land, liability may turn on such issues as fraud and other claims
based upon the interpretation of instruments used to transfer real
estate' 5 or a former landowner's liability for damages suffered by a
8 Id. at 1790-92. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); seegenerall, Com-
ment, The Expansion of Federal Common Law and Federal Question Jurisdiction to Interstate Pollution,
10 Hous. L. REv. 590 (1977); Annot., 31 L. Ed.2d 1006 (1972) ("The Supreme Court and
The Post-Erie Federal Common Law").
9 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (hereinafter Clean Water Act).
10 101 S. Ct. at 1800. This holding, while somewhat surprising in light of the recognition
of such a federal common law only nine years earlier, was not entirely unanticipated. See
Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 498-99 n.3 (1971); Note, Federal Common Law
and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1972).
11 See Middlesex County v. National Sea Clammers, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981); Costle v.
EPA, No. 1595 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 1981) (applying Ci of Milwaukee v. Illinois to Clean Air Act);
United States v. Price, No. 80-4104 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 1981) (hazardous waste disposal).
12 See notes 86 & 87 inra.
13 See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980).
14 Environmental quality is a traditional area of state concern. See Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981) (referring to the "substantial state interest in pro-
moting conservation of. . .natural resources. . .'); Agins v. City of Tihuron, 447 U.S. 225
(1980) (upholding "open space" zoning); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411
U.S. 325, 343 (1973) (pollution is historically within the police power of the state). In such
areas, see Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960), the displacement
of state law doctrines "is not lightly to be presumed." New York State Dept. of Social Servs.
v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973). See also Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d
1187 (6th Cir. 1981) ("solid waste disposal ...is a customary area of local concern long
reserved to state and local governments by practice, tradition and legal precedent."). But see
SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 975, 978 (S.D. Ohio 1981) ("This Court questions
whether hazardous waste problems are so parochial that they may properly be considered
matters of State policy rather than of national concern.').
15 See United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D.N.Y. filed Dec.
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subsequent landowner. 16 These are precisely the types of questions
that state, rather than federal, law is uniquely suited to resolve. 17
After City of Milwaukee v. Illinoz,1 8 Superfund ensures that such ques-
tions will be resolved under state law. Such a resolution affords states
the opportunity and the responsibility to establish liability standards
or schemes' 9 designed to protect the interests of all parties implicated
in hazardous waste disposal activity.
The legislative evolution of Superfund confirms its comprehen-
sive nature. As a broad federal response to the hazardous waste
problem, Superfund supplants the largely undefined remedies
20
20, 1979). The key liability questions will undoubtedly turn upon language contained in a
deed transferring certain Love Canal property:
Prior to the delivery of this instrument of conveyance, the grantee herein has
been advised by the grantor that the premises above described have been filled, in
whole or in part, to the present grade level thereof with waste products resulting
from the manufacturing of chemicals by the grantor at its plant in the City of
Niagara Falls, New York, and the grantee assumes all risk and liability incident to
the use thereof. It is therefore understood and agreed that, as a part of the consider-
ation for this conveyance and as a condition thereof, no claim, suit, action or de-
mand of any nature whatsoever shall ever be made by the grantee, its successors or
assigns, against the grantor, its successors or assigns, for injury to a persons or per-
sons, including death resulting therefrom, or loss of or damage to property caused
by, in connection with or by reason of the presence of said industrial wastes. It is
further agreed as a condition hereof that each subsequent conveyance of the afore-
said lands shall be make subject to the foregoing provisions and conditions.
See also State v. Ventron Corp., C-2996-75 (N.J. Super. Ct., Ch. Div. Aug. 27, 1979) (quoting
the terms of a realty deed in support of a finding that a party's failure to disclose mercury
contamination constituted fraud). Indeed, it has become quite clear that hazardous waste
disposal activity will give rise to a large number of private damage claims. Many of these
claims will turn upon the resolution of title conveyance and other issues which are tradition-
ally associated with real estate rather than tort law.
16 See United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D.N.Y. filed Dec.
20, 1979); United States v. Price, No. 80-4104 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 1981); State v. Ole Olsen,
Ltd., 38 A.D.2d 967, 331 N.Y.S.2d 761 (App. Div. 1972). See generally 58 AM. JUR.2d Nut-
sANCES § 50 (1971).
17 See Aberdeen v. Rockfish R.R., 409 U.S. 1207 (1972), in which the Supreme Court
wrote:
Our society and its governmental instrumentalities, having been less than alert
to the needs of our environment for generations, have now taken protective steps.
These developments, however praiseworthy, should not lead courts to exercise equi-
table powers loosely or casually whenever a claim of "environmental damage" is
asserted. The world must go on and new environmental legislation must be care-
fully meshed with traditional patterns of federal regulation.
409 U.S. at 1217-18.
18 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
19 See, e.g., Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. Department of Envt'l Reg., 390 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1980)
(private action to enjoin certain pollution activities established by state statute).
20 For an illustration ofjust how ill-defined the "environmental" rights and remedies of
private parties in the area of the federal common law actually were, compare the district and
appellate court opinions in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 380 F. Supp. 11 (D. Minn. 1974), 514
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available to civil claimants under the federal common law of nui-
sance.21 This pre-emption of federal common law will result in the
use of "express" Superfund standards22 for situations which Congress
directly addressed and will also result in the use of state common law
remedies for those areas not covered by Superfund. The purpose of
this article will be to examine the civil liability provisions of
Superfund to determine the extent to which these provisions modify
the role of the courts by pre-empting federal common law remedies
and by fostering the application of those state common law
principles.
II. Federal Legislative Efforts with Respect to Hazardous Wastes
Contrary to popular belief, federal involvement in environmen-
tal protection is longstanding.2 3 In 1899, Congress passed the Refuse
Act24 to prevent obstruction and contamination of navigable water-
ways.25 The Act made it unlawful to "discharge. . . from. . . [any]
manufacturing establishment . . . any refuse matter of any kind or
description . . . into any tributary of any navigable water of the
United States. . . without a permit."26 The statute provided crimi-
F.2d 492, modifed, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1975). See Note, The Standard ofProf Required To
Enjoin An Enviommental Hazard To The Public Health, 59 MINN. L. Rsv. 893 (1974).
21 It should be noted that Prosser has stated that "there is perhaps no more impenetrable
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance' ". W. PROSSER,
TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971). See generall.y Monaghan, The Supireme Court 1974 Tem--Forewor"
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1975); Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of The
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal
Law"; Competence and Discretion In The Choice of National and State Rules For Decision, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 797 (1957).
22 See text accompanying notes 116-24 infra.
23 See The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 51-907, § 6, 26 Stat. 453.
24 Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
25 The Act was a response to a Supreme Court decision holding that there was no federal
common law preventing obstructions to navigable waterways. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888). See Note, The Refise Act: Its Role Within The Scheme of Federal Water
Quality Legislation, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 304 (1971). While the language of the Act clearly
covered all discharges into navigable waterways, Congress apparently was more concerned
with dangers to navigation than with the conditions of the waterways themselves. See 21 Op.
Att'y Gen. 305 (1896); see also Eames, The Reise Act of 1899, Its Scope and Rol In Control of Water
Pollution, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173 (1971). Judicial constructions of the Act, however, have im-
posed liability despite the absence of any navigational obstruction. See United States v. Stan-
dard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United States v. Ballard Oil Co., 195 F.2d 369 (2d Cir.
1952); United States v. Maplewood Poultry Co., 327 F. Supp. 686 (D. Me. 1971).
26 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976). Refuse Act permits were originally to be issued by Secretary
of the Army. In 1970, however, authority to issue permits under the Refuse Act was trans-
ferred to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Exec. Order No. 11,574,35 Fed. Reg.
19,627 (1970).
[Vol. 57:260]
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nal penalties of $500 to $2,500 per day and imprisonment for as
much as one year.27 While initial federal enforcement efforts under
this statute were not vigorous 2 8 extensive legislation was ultimately
enacted to expand upon federal protection of environmental
resources.
29
It was not until the 1965 passage of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act,30 however, that the federal government began its direct and
comprehensive regulation of hazardous waste disposal. The Solid
Waste Disposal Act provided federal assistance to local governments
in the regulation of open dumpsites. In 1970, the Act was amended
3'
to provide for a comprehensive study of problems caused by hazard-
ous wastes.32 This study's findings contributed to the 1976 enact-
ment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),33
which was designed to provide a regulatory framework for the dispo-
sal of almost all industrial wastes.
Under RCRA, permits were required for the treatment, storage
or disposal of hazardous wastes. 34 RCRA created a "cradle to grave"
system of controls for such wastes through the imposition of stan-
dards for generators, transporters, treaters, and disposers. 35 These re-
quirements were designed to ensure the safe handling of hazardous
27 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976). It is interesting to note that this statute sought to address an
environmental problem by providing exclusively criminal penalties. But see United States v.
Wyandotte Transp. Co., 389 U.S. 191, 204 (1967) (injunctive actions permitted under the
Refuse Act). For a fascinating discussion of the propriety of utilizing criminal penalties in the
environmental protection area, see United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980), remanded on other groundr, 642 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1981).
See also Glenn, The Crime of Pollutiorn The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, 11
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 835 (1973).
28 See R. DRULEY, THE REFUSE AcT OF 1899 (BNA Monograph No. 11, 1972). Because
of enforcement problems presented by subsequent water pollution control legislation, how-
ever, this statute became an essential federal enforcement tool. See G.A.O., CONTROLLING
INDUSTRIAL WATER POLLUTION-PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS (1970).
29 See, e.g., National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4322-4374 (1976); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7602 (Supp. 1978); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (Clean Water Act).
30 Solid Waste Disposal Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, tit. II, 79 Stat. 997 (1965), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 2, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976)).
31 Pub. L. No. 91-512, tit. I, §§ 101-105, 84 Stat. 1227 (1970).
32 Id. § 104(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6981 (1976)).
33 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, §§ 1001-8007, 90 Stat.
2795 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as RCRA §§ 1001-8007] (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6987 (1976)).
34 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1976) (RCRA § 3005).
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6925 (1976) (RCRA §§ 3002-3005). These standards included the
imposition of a manifest system tracking hazardous wastes from generation through disposal,
id See 40 C.F.R. §§ 262-267 (1981). A comprehensive private post-disposal monitoring sys-
tem was left to a later day.
[December 1981]
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wastes from generation to disposal. Civil and criminal penalties were
provided for non-compliance.
36
While RCRA provided an extensive regulatory scheme for haz-
ardous waste disposition, several significant monitoring and enforce-
ment "gaps" existed. The most striking of these gaps concerned the
disclosure of, response to, and compensation for events which oc-
curred prior to the RCRA's enactment. RCRA imposed permit and
operating requirements upon parties engaged in the generation,
transportation, storage or disposal of hazardous wastes.37 These par-
ties were required to notify the EPA with respect to their present
activities.3 8 As orginally enacted, however, RCRA contained no dis-
posal site inventory or monitoring requirement. Such requirements
were not included under RCRA until October, 1980.
39
Moreover, even these belated inventory and monitoring provi-
sions were not directly applicable to private parties. RCRA did not
impose the obligation to prepare an inventory of hazardous waste
storage and disposal sites upon private parties, but rather upon the
states in which those sites were located.40 While federal funds were
provided to assist the states in carrying out their inventory pro-
grams,41 no incentives for private party disclosure were provided. In-
deed, RCRA provided a disincentive for former hazardous waste site
owners or operators to notify state authorities. Under RCRA's mul-
tistep monitoring provision,42 if the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) determined that a "substantial hazard to human
health or the environment" 43 was present at any present orformer
hazardous waste site, an order requiring "monitoring, testing, analy-
sis and reporting" at such site could be issued.44 Such an order could
require monitoring not only by present owners and operators, but by
certain previous owners and operators as well.45 Because RCRA im-
36 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1976) (RCRA § 3008).
37 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6925 (1976) (RCRA §§ 3002-3005); 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-267 (1981);
see 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 12,724 (1980).
38 42 U.S.C. § 6930 (1976) (RCRA § 3010). "Small generators" were excepted, but all
others were required to file a "Preliminary Notification of Hazardous Waste Activity" by
August 19, 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 12,746 (1980).
39 Pub. L. No. 96-482, § 17(a), 94 Stat. 2342 (1980) (RCRA §§ 3012 & 3013) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6933, 6944).
40 RCRA § 3012(a).
41 Id. § 3012(c).
42 Id. § 3013.
43 Id. § 3013(a)(2).
44 Id.
45 The statute is not clear concerning whether such orders also apply to sites which came
into existence before the enactment of RCRA. See RCRA § 3013(b); see also note 48 incfa.
[Vol. 57:260]
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posed both direct monitoring costs and civil penalties for non-compli-
ance with monitoring orders,46 former owners and operators were
reluctant to disclose the existence of these former hazardous waste
disposal sites to the states or the EPA.
RCRA's entire enforcement scheme was keyed to specific ad-
ministrative regulations.47 As the EPA itself recognized, these regula-
tions were "organized in a way which seems to contemplate coverage
only of those facilities which continue to operate after the effective
date of the regulations. ' 48 Many of the most serious environmental
problems posed by hazardous waste disposal, however, are presented
in circumstances where on-going activity49 is simply not involved.
50
While certain RCRA jurisdictional provisions were arguably appli-
46 RCRA § 3013(e).
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6925 (1976) (RCRA §§ 3002-3005).
48 45 Fed. Reg. 33,068 (1980) (EPA does not intend to regulate facilities closed before
statute). See Freeman v. Olin, No. 80-M-5057 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 1981). But Se United
States v. Price, No. 80-4104 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 1981) ("The gravamen of a [RCRA] Section
7003 action. . . is not defendants' dumping practices which. . . ceased. . . in 1972, but the
present imminent hazard posed by the continuing disposal (i.e. leaking) of contaminants into
the groundwater").
49 The applicability of RCRA to activity engaged in prior to the enactment of the statute
is, of course, not the only timing problem presented. Perhaps even more immediately signifi-
cant is the level of compliance required for hazardous waste storage or disposal facilities
which have been accorded "interim status" under the statute. In enacting RCRA, Congress
recognized that the EPA would not be capable of issuing all of the necessary RCRA permits
in a timely fashion. To meet this problem, Congress provided that "any person who . ..
operates a facility required to have a [RCRA] permit. . .[who] has made an application for
[such] a permit [on or before] .. .shall be treated as having been issued such permit until
such time as final administrative disposition of such application is made . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 6925(e) (1976) (RCRA § 3005). EPA has recognized that RCRA grants automatic interim
status to operators of waste storage facilitities and that certain "commentators" believe that
RCRA does not "[authorize] EPA to impose facility requirements during the interim status
period." 45 Fed. Reg. 33,158 (1980). The EPA, however, issued interim standards for the
continued operation of waste storage facilities. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,254-58 (1980).
The possible penalty for failure to meet these interim requirements is not clear. 42
U.S.C. § 6928 (1976) sets forth RCRA's federal enforcement provision. As originally enacted,
this section provided for compliance orders and possible civil and criminal penalties of
$25,000 per day and imprisonment for one year. The section, however, did not contain any
explicit authorization of EPA's interim standards; nor did it contain a formula for assessing
civil or criminal penalties for alleged violations of these standards.
Late in 1980, however, Congress amended RCRA to provide for criminal penalties for
any party who failed to comply with these interim standards and thereby knowingly placed
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. Pub. L. No. 96-482,
§ 13, 94 Stat. 2339 (1980) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(1)(B)). These criminal penal-
ties could involve a fine of as much as $250,000 and imprisonment for as long as five years.
Civil penalties of $25,000 per day were also provided for such life threatening violations of
EPA interim standards. Id.
50 See, .g., United States v. Price, No. 80-4104 (D.NJ. Sept. 3, 1981); United States v.
Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 20, 1979); State v. Ole
[December 1981]
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cable in such circumstances, 51 its permit and notification require-
ments were not52 and discovery of the source of environmental
problems remained just as difficult as it had been prior to RCRA's
enactment. 53 In part to remedy this problem, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(Superfund)5 4 was enacted.
III. Superfund
As originally proposed, Superfund was a multi-faceted federal
regulatory scheme designed to provide an independent basis for envi-
ronmental claims by both government and private parties.55 Many
Olsen, Ltd., 38 A.D.2d 967, 331 N.Y.S.2d 761 (App. Div. 1972); Lamb v. Roberts, 196 Ala.
679, 72 So. 309 (1916).
51 Section 7003 of RCRA provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, upon receipt of evidence that the
handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or haz-
ardous waste is presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or
environment, the Administrator may bring suit on behalf of the United States in
the appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person contributing to
the alleged disposal to stop such handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or
disposal or to take such other action as may be necessary. The Administrator shall
provide notice to the affected state of any such suit.
42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. 1978). This section, however, has been interpreted as conveying
jurisdiction upon the federal courts in instances where an imminent hazard is presented, as
opposed to providing substantive hazardous waste liability standards. See Freeman v. Olin,
No. 80-M-5057 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 14, 1981); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F.
Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp.
138, 144 (N.D. Ind. 1980).
52 See note 48 supra.
53 Some courts have found RCRA § 7003 to be substantive rather than jurisdictional,
and have purported to determine hazardous waste liability questions in accordance with the
"standards" imposed by this section. See United States v. Price, No. 80-4104 (D.NJ. Sept. 23,
1981); United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., No. C80-1857 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 1981).
This view is not supported by the legislative history of RCRA. See [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6308. Section 7003 is found in "Miscellaneous Provisions" of RCRA's sub-
chapter VII, which do not otherwise establish any substantive rights or liabilities. It is doubt-
ful that § 7003 was designed to do any more than provide access to the federal courts in
certain "emergency" situations. See note 51 supra.
54 See note 5 upra.
55 See 125 CONG. REC. S9173-9180 (daily ed. July 11, 1979). Early drafts of Superfund
contained explicit provisions that:
notwithstanding the ordinary requirements for proof of cause in fact or the proxi-
mate cause of damage, injury or loss, a person liable under this section for any
discharge, release or disposal of any hazardous substance, shall be liable for all med-
ical expenses [incurred by a claimant] . ..if a reasonable person could conclude
that such medical expenses and the injury or disease which caused them are reason-
ably related to such discharge, release or disposal, including but not limited to the
consideration of statistical correlation and the increase of incidents of such injury or
[Vol. 57:260]
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controversial elements of Superfund were eliminated 56 in the effort to
pass a comprehensive regulatory scheme for hazardous waste man-
agement before the Reagan administration took office.57 Even in its
modified form, however, Superfund is a drastic change from the pre-
vious regulatory scheme.
Superfund contains both a revenue58 and a regulatory59 aspect.
Under its revenue aspect, excise taxes are imposed upon generators of
chemical and petroleum products60 and upon hazardous waste dispo-
sal sites.6 1 The tax upon generators is to be added to other govern-
mental revenues62 to fund a Hazardous Substances Response Fund.
This fund will be used to pay governmental response costs 63 in the
clean up of hazardous substance deposits and spills. The disposal site
tax will be used to establish a Post Closure Fund to finance the moni-
toring and closure of hazardous waste disposal sites which received
RCRA operating permits.
64
Superfund's regulatory aspect fills many of the RCRA's gaps by
requiring extensive reporting and recordkeeping for both present and
former hazardous waste disposal sites.65 Hazardous waste disposal
sites which did not apply for RCRA permits must be reported.
66
disease in the exposed population above that which is otherwise statistically
probable.
Id. at S9176.
56 These included, for example, the epidemiological provisions cited in note 55 supra; an
explicit provision that liability was to be "strict, joint and several;" a reduction of the size of
the Superfund "fund" from $4.1 billion over six years to $1.6 billion over five years, see 11
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1097 (1980); and the addition of "causation" defenses for hazardous
waste generators.
57 See Note, Liability for Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement
Mechanisms, 69 GEo. L.J. 1047, 1057 n.61 (1981); 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3435 (Nov. 28,
1980). The last minute compromises which were made in order to assure passage of
Superfund resulted in an almost total absence of meaningful legislative history on key liabil-
ity questions. While much congressional discussion can be found on liability issues, this dis-
cussion often relates to early drafts of the statute, rather than the language contained in
Superfund, as enacted. See note 121 infta.
58 Superfund, supra note 5, §§ 201-232.
59 Id. §§ 101-115.
60 Id. § 211. These excise taxes are imposed at a rate of $.79 per barrel of crude oil and
from $.22 to $4.87 per ton of certain industrial chemicals.
61 Id. § 231. This tax is imposed at the rate of $2.13 per dry weight ton of hazardous
waste.
62 Seven-eighths of the fund is financed through taxes, and one-eighth through
appropriations.
63 Id. §221(c).
64 Id. § 232. Seeid. §§ 107(k)(1)(B) & 1110).
65 Id. § 103.
66 Id. § 103(c). Certain. "de minimis" exceptions have been made to this reporting re-
quirement. See 46 Fed. Reg. 22,144 (1981).
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Such disclosure has to include the existence of the site, the amount
and type of hazardous wastes disposed there, and the likelihood of
escape of those substances.67 Significantly, this reporting require-
ment is imposed upon both present and former owners of such sites,68
thereby fostering disclosure of inactive or unknown sites.
69
Site notification, however, is not Superfund's only disclosure re-
quirement. Any party in charge of a facility at which a release of a
reportable quantity70 of hazardous substances occurred is required to
notify the EPA. Release 7' is broadly defined to include almost all
"spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharg-
ing, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the en-
vironment .... ,,72 Similarly, "hazardous substance" is defined to
include all of the thousands of substances listed or designated as haz-
ardous under the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, RCRA and
the Toxic Substances Control Act.7 3 Criminal liability is provided
for failure to meet these notification requirements.7 4
The disclosure requirements in turn facilitate the governmental
67 Superfund, supra note 5, § 103(c). The EPA has issued a proposed form for use in
meeting this reporting requirement. 46 Fed. Reg. 22,155-56 (1981).
68 Superfund, supra note 5, § 103(e). It should be noted that this reporting requirement
applied only to wastes listed as hazardous under RCRA and not to all wastes which could be
listed as hazardous under the terms of Superfund itself. See note 73 infta.
69 See 46 Fed. Reg. 22,144, 22,147 (1981) (noting that the disclosure requirements of
§ 103(c) were designed in part to "alert the Agency to. . .on-site [disposal] activities"). The
provisions of § 103(c) are not, of course, the first federal effort to identify hazardous waste
disposal sites. In 1969, for example, the U.S. House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce surveyed large chemical companies for information on hazardous waste disposal
sites. 46 Fed. Reg. 22,147 (1981).
70 Superfund, supra note 5, § 102. As to those substances for which "reportable quanti-
ties" were established under § 311 of the Clean Water Act, Superfund set forth a "one
pound" standard. Id. § 102(b). This standard, however, is largely illusory, because the stat-
ute does not indicate whether "one pound" means "one pound per discharge," "one pound
per day," or a "total of one pound." Since § 311 of the Clean Water Act permits certain
discharges of up to 5000 pounds per day, 40 C.F.R. § 117.3 (1981), it is unlikely that
Superfund's poundage limitation is based on a one day period.
On May 28, 1981, the EPA issued a draft of a notification requirement which did raise
certain notification levels. 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 360 (1981). The reportable quantities vary
from one to one hundred pounds depending upon the type of chemical. Id
71 Id. § 101(22).
72 Environment is defined to include "navigable waters . ..and .. .surface water,
groundwater, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air...
under the jurisdiction of the United States." Id. § 101(8). The EPA has issued a draft
rule/policy statement which modifies these broad notification requirements with respect to
incidental spillage and other releases which clearly do not "demand immediate response."
See Inside EPA Weekly Report, Vol. 2, No. 13 (Mar. 27, 1981), at 1, 7-8.
73 Superfund, supra note 5, § 101(14).
74 Id. §§ 103(b), (c).
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response mechanism established by the statute. Under Superfund,
the President is required to establish a National Contingency Plan
75
which sets forth procedures and standards for response to releases of
hazardous substances. 6 This plan is to establish procedures for dis-
covering hazardous waste locations and for evaluating removal costs
and methods.77 Parties associated with the generation or manage-
ment of hazardous substances are required to furnish information to
the EPA with respect to these substances and to permit on-site in-
spections and sampling.
78
Under the statute, the President is empowered to exercise "re-
sponse authority" to actual or threatened releases of hazardous sub-
stances. 79 This statutory response authority permits the President to
take whatever remedial steps are "necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment. "8 0 In addition, when the Presi-
dent determines that there may be an imminent and substantial dan-
ger to the public health or welfare or to the environment, he may
order the attorney general to seek legal or equitable relief or, after
notice to the state, issue all necessary remedial protective orders. 8 1
With respect to releases of hazardous substances,82 responsible
parties83 are liable for: (1) governmental response costs; (2) private
75 The EPA has not yet established such a plan, but has promised to send a proposed
National Contingency Plan to Congress by April, 1982. 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 544 (1981).
The delays in publication are apparently the result of the difficulties in formulating cleanup
procedures on a case by case basis. Id. at 681.
The Environmental Defense Fund has filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia to compel the EPA to publish the proposed plan by February 1,
1982. Id. at 544.
The present delay in promulgating the plan has resulted in the odd situation of plaintiffs
instituting suits under Superfund and claiming that their demands are consistent with a Na-
tional Contingency Plan not in existence. See Complaint, par. 53, City of Philadelphia v.
Stepan, No. 81-0851 (E.D. Pa. filed Mar. 9, 1981).
76 Superfund, supra note 5, § 105.
77 Id. The plan also will establish a system of state and federal cooperation, and will
analyze cost effectiveness, and will determine priorities for responses to threatened releases.
Id.
78 Id. § 104(e).
79 Id. § 104. The President has delegated this emergency power to a variety of federal
agencies ranging from the EPA to the Coast Guard. Exec. Order No. 12,316, 46 Fed. Reg.
42,237 (1981).
80 Superfund, supra note 5, § 104(a)(1).
81 Id. § 106(a).
82 See note 73 sura.
83 Superfund, supra note 5, § 107(a). Responsible parties are defined to include:
(1) present and certain former owners or operators of the facility from which the hazardous
substance was released; (2) transporters of the released substance; and (3) those who ar-
ranged for transport or disposal of the released substance (usually generators). See id.
§ 101(32).
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response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan; and
(3) damages for injury to natural resources. 84 Liability is imposed
unless the responsible party can demonstrate that the extremely lim-
ited affirmative defenses available under the statute should apply.
85
IV. Post-Superfund Liability for Hazardous
Waste Disposal Activity
Prior to Superfund, numerous actions were instituted in federal
courts seeking compensation for injuries allegedly suffered as a result
of hazardous waste disposal activities. These actions were based
upon numerous legal theories. 86 Often included among these theo-
ries was the federal common law of nuisance.
87
In 1972 in Illinois v. Cio of Milwaukee,88 the Supreme Court ex-
plicitly recognized a federal common law of nuisance with respect to
interstate water pollution. This federal common law was meant to
provide "each state the right to be free from unreasonable interfer-
ence with its natural environment and resources when the interfer-
ence stems from another state or its citizens.1 89 Federal courts
applied this doctrine not only to air9° and water 9' pollution but also
84 Id. § 107(a).
85 Id. § 107(b). Liability is not imposed for releases caused solely by: (1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war; or (3) an act or omission of a third party if the third party is not an agent
or employee of the defendant and if the defendant can establish that he exercised due care
with respect to the hazardous substance involved and took precautions against the foreseeable
acts and omissions of the third party. Id. Comparable liability defenses are provided under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(0(1) (1976).
86 Se, e.g., United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977) (Refuse Act of 1899);
United States v. Duracell, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (Clean Water Act);
United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (RCRA and Clean
Water Act); United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980)
(RCRA); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980)
(RCRA); United States v. Union Corp., No. 80-1589 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1980) (Toxic Sub-
stance Control Act); United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D.N.Y.,
filed Dec. 20, 1979) (Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act). Seegenerally R. MOcrr,
HAzARDtous WASTE LITIGATION (1981).
87 See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980);
United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980); United
States v. Petrol Processors, Inc., No. 80-358-B (M.D. La. July 15, 1980); United States v.
Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 20, 1979).
88 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
89 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1801 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
See Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980).
90 See Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972) (plaintiffs allowed to
renew public nuisance allegation in district court); Board of Supervisors v. United States, 408
F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1976), appea/di~mised, 551 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1977). But see Virginians
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to problems of hazardous waste disposal.92
The federal common law of nuisance is a relatively recent judi-
cial creation and has not been well defined.9 3 Questions concerning
the standing of private parties to base actions upon such federal com-
mon law94 and the applicability of this doctrine to purely intrastate
activity95 were the subject of dispute in the federal courts. It was
clear, however, that federal courts would not hesitate to use this tool
in their attempts to solve the environmental problems caused by haz-
ardous waste disposal activity. The courts spoke of the "strong fed-
eral interest in preventing and abating incidents of ground water
pollution caused by the disposal of hazardous waste" 96 and the
"overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision
S. .- in this area.
In a single stroke, however, Superfund eliminated the applica-
tion of the federal common law of nuisance to hazardous waste activ-
ity. Federal courts are now limited to determining questions of
statutory liability and to applying state, rather than federal, rules of
decision with respect to private liability questions.9 8
for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972), modfled, 541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976)
(federal statutes pre-empted federal common law of nuisance for aircraft emissions).
91 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Illinois v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 3152 (1981);
Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 992 (1979). See
also Note, Federal Common Law Remediesfor the Abatement of Water Pollution, 5 FORD. URB. L.J.
546 (1977).
92 United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980). See
Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 137 (1976).
93 Recognizing the existence of a federal common law of nuisance does not, of course,
define the parameters of such a doctrine. See Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Ad-
min., 541 F.2d 119, 122-23 (Ist Cir. 1976). Some courts would have based the doctrine upon
the Restatement of Torts, see id; United States v. Ira. S. Bushey & Sons, 363 F. Supp. 110 (D.
Vt. 1973); PLI, HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIGATION 51 (R. Mott, chairman 1981). See also In re
Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 322 n.9 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
94 See Middlesex County v. National Sea Clammers, 101 S. Ct. 2514 (1981) (declining to
decide the issue of private party standing). Compare Committee for Consideration of Jones
Falls Sewage System v. Train, 375 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Md. 1974), af'd, 539 F.2d 1006 (4th Cir.
1976) with Byram River v. Port Chester, 394 F. Supp. 618 (D. Conn. 1974). See generaly
Prosser, Private Actionfor Public Nuisance, 53 VA. L. REV. 997 (1966).
95 Compare Illinois v. Outboard Marine Corp., 619 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. granted,
vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 3152 (1981) with Ancarrow v. City of Richmond, 600 F.2d 443,
445 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 991 (1979).
96 United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1138 (D. Conn. 1980).
97 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972).
98 Of course, federal common law may not have differed substantially from state law
concerning private liability. See United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 446 F. Supp. 1127,
1142 (D. Conn. 1980). For example, in In re Oswego Barge Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312, 322 (D.
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In City of Milwaukee v. llinois,99 the Supreme Court considered
for the first time the impact of federal environmental legislation
upon the power of federal courts to fashion federal common law rem-
edies. In a 6-3 opinion, the Court ruled that Milwaukee's liability for
emitting raw sewage into Lake Michigan was to be governed exclu-
sively by the standards established under the federal Clean Water
Act and not by any federal common law nuisance theory.100 The
Court reasoned that "as soon as Congress 'addresses a question previ-
ously governed' by federal common law, the need for such [a body of
law] disappears."' 1 1 In determining whether Congess had "occupied
the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory
program," the Court would "start with the assumption that it is for
Congress not the federal courts to articulate the appropriate stan-
dards to be applied as a matter of federal law."' 0 2 In reaching its
decision, the majority emphasized that "Congress' intent . . . was
clearly to establish an all-encompassing program of water pollution
regulation."'
10 3
The applicability of City of Milwaukee v. Illinois 10 4 to Superfund's
regulation of hazardous wastes is manifest. The Act's title, Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, indicates its comprehensive scope. As originally proposed,
Superfund would have involved an even broader federal involvement
in hazardous waste regulation. 10 5 Congress' rejection of this broader
role, however, does not diminish the comprehensive nature of this
effort to fill the gaps in federal supervision of hazardous waste dispo-
sal activity.
10 6
Conn. 1977), the court found no substantial differences between federal common law and
New York common law of nuisance.
In view of the possible conflict between a nationally consistent federal common law and
important state interests, however, there is no assurance that the state liability standards will
be the same as those of a federal common law. See Note, The Orginal/Jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665, 682 n.122 (1959); see also notes 153 & 154 in/fa.
99 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
100 Id. at 1792.
101 Id. at 1791.
102 Id. at 1792. The majority pointed out that this analysis was different from the one
used to determine whether federal statutes pre-empted state regulation. Id.
103 Id. at 1792. Indeed, the Court felt that this congressional intent was strong enough to
overcome an explicit statutory provision that the authorized citizen suits were not to supplant
common law remedies.
104 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981).
105 See note 56 supra.
106 See note 2 supra. See aLso R. ZENER, GUIDE TO FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 197
(P.L.I. 1981) ("Government enforcement officials have encountered several major obstacles in
their efforts to clean up abandoned disposal sites. . . For these and other reasons, Congress
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Superfund has an extensive civil liability provision. 10 7 Present
and former owners and operators of waste facilities, transporters, and
generators may be liable for:
[A]ll costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan;
[A]ny other necessary costs of response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan; and
Damages for injury to natural resources.10 8
Conspicuous by their absence, however, are any provisions for
the recovery of consequential, personal injury or other damages by
private claimants. 0 9 Similarly absent is any provision for recovery of
damages to natural resources occurring prior to Superfund's enact-
ment. 110 While all liability claims under the Act are to be deter-
mined in federal court without regard to the citizenship of the parties
or the amounts in controversy,"'I many potentially significant liabil-
ity claims simply are not addressed by Superfund.
After Superfund, it is uncertain how statutory liability issues are
to be resolved, and what standards are to be applied to private liabil-
ity claims not addressed by the statute.
While not the epitomy of clarity, Superfund was not completely
silent on these questions. Section 101(32)112 provides that the liabil-
enacted a comprehensive legislative approach to the problem of abandoned disposal sites in
late 1980.").
107 Superfund, supra note 5, § 107. The liability provisions of Superfund are rather harsh
and may include punitive damages up to three times the removal costs. Id. § 107(c)(3).
Damage limitation amounts are also very high. Id.
108 Id. § 107(a). In addition, the President may, when he "determines that there may be
an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment because of an actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility,"
require the attorney general to bring a suit for abatement. Id. § 106. The district court is
authorized to "grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may re-
quire." Id. § 106(a). The President is given broad authority to issue "such orders as may be
necessary to protect public health and welfare and the environment." Id. Willful violation of
such an order may result in a fine of $5,000 for each day of violation, id. § 106(b), or treble
damages, id. § 107(c)(3).
Substantial questions remain to be answered concerning the relationship of the § 106
imminent endangerment action and a § 107 liability claim. Thus, while defendants may only
avail themselves of very limited defenses in § 107 actiorfs, see note 85 supra, § 106 seems to
indicate that defendants may have traditional equitable defenses such as estoppel or laches
available to them in a § 106 proceeding.
109 Except, of course, to the extent that such damages can be recovered by private parties
as response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan. See note 84 sup ra.
110 See Superfund, sura note 5, § 111(d)(1).
111 Id. § 113(b).
112 Id. § 101(32). See text accompanying notes 116-24 infra.
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ity standard under the Act is the same as that imposed under section
311 of the Clean Water Act." 3 Superfund also provides that "noth-
ing in this Act shall affect or modify in any way the obligations or
liabilities of any person under other Federal or State law, including
common law, with respect to releases of hazardous sub-
stances .... ,,14 Furthermore, Congress indicated that nothing in
Superfund shall be construed or interpreted as pre-empting any state
from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect
to the release of hazardous substances within such state." 
5
In view of these legislative pronouncements, the problem for the
courts lies in determining how these statutory pre-emption and stan-
dard of liability declarations are to be applied to the numerous po-
tential liability situations which arise in the area of hazardous waste
disposal activity.
V. Direct Superfund Liability
In situations directly addressed by Superfund, liability is to be
determined by the standards of section 311 of the Clean Water
Act."16  This section has been held to impose strict liability.
' 7
Superfund's reference to the Clean Water Act's liability standard,
however, may raise more questions than it answers.
Courts interpreting section 311 have carefully examined the
Clean Water Act's legislative history." 8 In each case, the courts have
found that Congress intended to impose strict liability. These find-
ings, however, came in the context of determining the liability of par-
ties intimately involved in the challenged pollution activity, and
thus, congressional intent was relatively clear." 9
113 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976). See text accompanying notes 116-19 infra.
114 Superfund, supra note 5, § 302(d). See text accompanying notes 129-31 infra.
115 Id. § 114(a).
116 See note 113 supra.
117 See United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 101 S. Ct. 3031 (1981); Stuart Transp. Co. v. United States, 596 F.2d 609 (4th Cir.
1979); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 941 (1978).
But see Hollywood Marine, Inc. v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 2336 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
118 See note 117 supra.
119 At issue in both LeBeouf and Burgess, supra note 117, was the scope of § 31 I's third
party defense. The LeBeouf court held that a tugboat crew was not such a third party as to
relieve the owner-operator from liability. 621 F.2d at 788. In Burgess, the court held that a
supertanker's temporary local pilot was not a third party under § 311. 564 F.2d at 982. Both
courts emphasized that the available defenses had to be narrowly construed in order to effec-
tuate congressional intent. 621 F.2d at 789. But see Hollywood Marine, Inc. v. United States,
101 S. Ct. 2336 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (no reason to construe § 311 narrowly).
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Superfund, on the other hand, imposes liability upon many par-
ties whose connection with the injuries involved may be much less
obvious.1 20  In such cases, the courts will have to examine
Superfund's legislative history to determine if the strict liability stan-
dard should be applied. 121 In view of the numerous potential liabil-
ity situations which can arise in hazardous waste disposal activity, it
is impossible to determine just what this evaluation of legislative in-
tent will disclose in any particular case.
It is clear, however, that Superfund's strict liability standards
should be confined to those parties who engaged in substantial and
purposeful hazardous waste disposal activity for commercial profit
after the enactment of this statute. Automatic application of strict
liability to parties whose conduct was substantially unrelated to the
present danger posed by the hazardous waste release1 22 or who did
not obtain commercial benefit from their conduct,1 23 does not appear
to be compelled by the environmental concerns which gave rise to
Superfund.124
120 An example of such a party would be a municipality which foreclosed upon a hazard-
ous waste disposal site for tax deficiencies. The municipality would thus become liable as a
present or former owner of the site. Where the relationship between former activity and
present injury is tenuous, as in the case of a generator, automatic imposition of strict liability
may be uncalled for.
121 As indicated above, Superfund's legislative history is not particularly clear. See note
57 supra. Some proponents of Superfund argued that § 101 (32) would impose the strict liabil-
ity standard. See 126 CONG. REC. S 14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Ran-
dolph); 126 CONG. REC. HI 1,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Florio).
An express provision imposing strict liability for hazardous substance spills was elimi-
nated from the final version of Superfund. See 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3435 (Nov. 28,
1980); Note, Liabilityfor Generators of Hazardous Waste." The Failure of Exirting Enforcement Mecha-
niims, 69 GEo. L.J. 1047, 1056-58 (1981).
Section 302(d) of Superfund provides that the statute "shall not be. . . interpreted...
as reflecting a determination . . . of policy regarding the inapplicability of strict liability."
Superfund, supra note 5, § 302(d). See 126 CONG. REC. HI 1,790 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980)
(remarks of Rep. Broyhill). Thus, there is a substantial question concerning the automatic
application of strict liability.
122 See United States v. Price, No. 80-4104 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 1981) (defendants bought
property several years after dumping had ceased).
123 See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., No. 79-990 (W.D.N.Y. filed
Dec. 20, 1979) (Love Canal municipal defendants).
124 The elimination of language imposing strict liability to all Superfund claims was a
part of a compromise designed to accommodate concerns for a safe and clean environment
with a desire to limit the costs of obtaining these environmental goals. Thus, § 104(c)(4)
requires a cost/benefit analysis for certain Superfund expenditures. Superfund, supra note 5,
§ 104(c)(4). Responsible parties are also exonerated from liability for damage to natural re-
sources prior to Superfund. Id. § 107().
Imposing strict liability upon parties who have not engaged in substantial and pur-
poseful hazardous waste activity is not compelled by express statutory terms. Moreover, such
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The strict liability standard, however, will no doubt be applied
in some instances. Thus, parties whose involvement with hazardous
waste disposal activity ended long before Superfund may be held to a
retroactive strict liability standard while at the same time they are
deprived of traditional defenses applicable under such a standard.' 25
Even without considering the questionable policy considerations in-
herent in such a use of strict liability, 126 there can be little doubt that
such an application of Superfund "create[s]" a new obligation, . ..
[and] .. .attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions . ..
already past." 127 Such retroactive application of a federal civil stat-
ute would violate the due process provisions of the fifth amendment
because it would inflict a "manifest injustice" upon certain affected
imposition is not consistent with the congressional goals evidenced by the compromise nature
of Superfund. See note 121 supra.
Strict liability is not the only question raised by the ambiguous § 101(32). Joint and
several liability issues will have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. To resolve these issues
both the status and conduct of the particular defendants will have to be examined and the
legislative histories of both the Clean Water Act and Superfund will have to be consulted.
Compare 126 CONG. REc. Hl 1,788-89 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1980) with 126 CONG. REc. S14,964
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) and 126 CONG. REC. S14,003 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980).
125 See note 85 supra.
126 See Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936); Note, Strict Liabil-
ify for Generators, Transporters and Disporters of Hazardous Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REv. 949, 970
(1980); Note, Liabilityfor Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mecha-
nisms, 69 GEO. L.J. 1047, 1065 n.104 (1981) ("Imposing strict liability for unavoidable harm
may indirectly affect a community adversely by leading area businesses to avoid useful, but
dangerous activity."); Coleman, The Moraliy ofStrict Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 259
(1976). But see Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARv. L. REV. 584,
588-89 (1981).
127 Sturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1885). Arguably, only the actual or threatened
present release of hazardous substances triggers § 107 liability and, thus, this section presents
no retroactivity problem. See United States v. Price, No. 80-4104 (D.NJ. Sept. 23, 1981)
("Because the gravamen of a [RCRA] section 7003 action is the current existence of a hazard-
ous condition, not the past commission of any acts, we see no retroactivity problem with the
statute.' ; United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980). Such an
argument, however, misapprehends the nature of the retroactivity problem and assumes the
answer to the question which is presented under § 107 when liability is sought to be imposed
with respect to conduct antedating Superfund. At the time ofsuch conduct, the parties had a
reasonable expectation concerning the consequences of this conduct. See State v. Ventron
Corp., No. C2996-75 (N.J. Super Ct., Chan. Div. Aug. 27, 1979) ("the actions of the defend-
ants must be measured as of the date they occurred"). To say that the 1980 application of
§ 107 liability to a party who transported wastes to a sanitary landfill in 1940 is not retroac-
tive as it applies, because there is a present danger that these wastes may cause damage, is to
all but eviscerate the limited retroactivity protections provided by the United States Constitu-
tion. See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384-85 (1878); Annot., 53 L.Ed.2d 1146, 1153
(1977), and the fifth amendment, Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1976) ("The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects must meet
the tests of due process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.").
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parties.2128
A statute will only be found to be unconstitutionally retroactive,
however, if there is no rational interpretation of that statute which
would avoid an unconstitutionally harsh application. Accordingly,
defendants faced with a manifestly unjust retroactive application of
Superfund will be able to invoke the savings provision of Superfund
section 302.129 At the time that such defendants engaged in the con-
duct which presently gives rise to Superfund liability, state and fed-
eral common law liability standards were in full force.' 30 To the
extent that these former standards and defenses were co-extensive
with or more restrictive than those applied under Superfund, no con-
stitutional issue is presented by the application of the Superfund
standards. In such cases no new obligation or disability is being ap-
plied.13' To the extent that Superfund may apply a stricter standard
with respect to such defendants, the section 302 savings clause obli-
gates the courts to examine the state and federal law in effect at the
time of the subject activity. The courts must then apply the standard
which preserves as much of Superfund's remedial purposes as possi-
ble, while at the same time ensuring that the strict Superfund stan-
dards are not given an unconstitutionally retroactive effect.
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a comprehensive
examination of the state and federal law applicable to hazardous
waste disposal activities. It is clear, however, that despite
Superfund's pre-emption of federal common law in this area, the de-
termination of the possibly unconstitutional retroactive application
of Superfund's liability provisions may make this very federal com-
mon law essential in the resolution of key Superfund liability
questions.
VI. Non-Superfund Liability Standards
Perhaps even more significant than the question of direct
128 Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696 (1974). Unconstitutionality results if
"retroactivity inflicts a 'manifest injustice' considering (a) the nature of and identity of the
parties, (b) the nature of their rights, and (c) the nature of the impact of the change in law
upon those rights." Id. at 711.
Under Superfund, parties who engaged in conduct which met the hightest possible safety
standards could be subjected to liability without fault decades after their association with the
hazardous waste activity ceased. The imposition of such liability upon parties whose conduct
was not subject to any common law or statutory standard or prohibition would clearly violate
"obvious justice." Union Pacific R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199 (1913).
129 Superfund, supra note 5, § 302(d). See text accompanying note 114 supra.
130 See United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127, 1129 (D. Conn. 1980).
131 Id.
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Superfund liability is the determination of hazardous waste liability
claims not directly addressed by Superfund.' 32 Such claims would
include all private actions seeking recovery for items which are not
considered appropriate response costs under the National Contin-
gency Plan.133 It seems clear that the statute's pre-emption sections
preclude any argument that, because private damage claims are not
addressed in Superfund, they have been eliminated. The issue
presented by such claims, however, is whether the applicable liability
standard is to be found in Superfund, the federal common law or
some other authority.
There is a strong consistency argument that all interstate haz-
ardous waste disposal claims should be based upon Superfund's stan-
dards. Under such a system, the same liability standards would be
applied for hazardous waste damage to either natural resources or
private property. Congress, however, simply did not address the
question of liability standards for releases of hazardous wastes which
cause purely private injury. 34 Not only does Superfund contain no
"direct action" provision, but private personal injury claims were
quite specifically excluded from the expanded scope of liability and
the restricted affirmative defenses under the Act.
135
There is, however, no need for consistency in determining liabil-
132 Determining precisely which claims are compensable under Superfund will not be an
easy task. Direct Superfund recovery can be had for private and governmental response costs
and for post-Superfund damages to natural resources. See Superfund, supira note 5, §§ 107(a),
(). Because of the delay of the National Contingency Plan, issues concerning the recovery of
response costs have not yet even been formulated, let alone resolved. See note 75 sufira.
In addition, claims for natural resource damages will present many problems. The EPA
appears to be anxious to control the scope of private response and natural resource claims
under the Act. EPA interim guidance reports on Superfund claims indicated that "pre-au-
thorization" by the EPA will be required before a private party cleanup claim will be com-
pensable. [Current Developments] ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 575 (Sept. 11, 1980).
Perhaps the principal issue which will arise with respect to the direct applicability of
Superfund, however, is how groundwater damage is to be treated under this Act, and how
damage to this resource is to be measured. While "groundwater" is included in the definition
of "natural resources" under Superfund, it is limited to groundwater controlled by federal,
state or local governments. Superfund, supra note 5, § 101 (16). Whether the specific govern-
mental interest in groundwater regulation will supplant all private claims in this crucial area
is a question which is not answered by the meager legislative history of Superfund. See S.
Rep. No. 96-848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1980). Ultimately, this question may turn largely
on the state or local law applicable in the location where the groundwater pollution occurs or
is threatened. See R. ZENER, GUIDE TO FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 377 (P.L.I. 1981);
see generally David, Groundwater Pollution. Case Law Theories For Relief, 39 Mo. L. REv. 117
(1974).
133 See notes 75-77 supra.
134 See note 109 supra.
135 See notes 55 & 56 sup ra.
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ity for conduct which gives rise to very different types of damage.
The burden imposed on a trial court might be reduced if the stan-
dards for injury to private property were the same as the standards of
liability for natural resource damage under Superfund. The nature
of the governmental interest in natural resources, however, is so dif-
ferent from purely private ownership claims that a different standard
of liability is not without justification. 136 Consistency alone is an in-
sufficient basis upon which to compel the application of Superfund
liability standards with respect to claims not addressed by the
statute.
37
In light of the potentially interstate character of the acts giving
rise to private damage claims, it could be argued that liability for
such claims should be determined under a federal common law nui-
sance theory which would be consistently applied throughout the
United States. 138 In fact, however, the comprehensive nature of the
problem Superfund addresses and the explicit federal legislative deci-
sions which were made in addressing these problems all but preclude
this determination.139 City of Milwaukee v. Ilinois '40 clearly stands for
the proposition that areas in which there has been comprehensive
federal environmental legislation are no longer governed by federal
common law.
Thus, it seems that all liability questions in the hazardous waste
disposal area which are not directly addressed by Superfund will be
determined by applicable state statutory and common law. '41 A full
136 See Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution: Statutoy -Pre-emption or Preservation, 49
FORD. L. REv. 500 (1981); see also W. PROSSER, TORTS 572-73 (4th ed. 1971) (discussion of
different interests in public and private nuisance actions).
137 With respect to consistency, there is no federal interest in applying uniformity for its
own sake. In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 635 F.2d 987, 993 (1980), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3487 (U.S. Dec. 14, 1981); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 101 S.
Ct. 2870 (1981) (no need for uniform interpretation of laws that vary from state to state).
138 See generally Stewart, Pramids of Saaife? Problems ofFederalism In Mandating State Imple-
mentation of ationalEnvironmentalPoliy,, 86 YALE L.J. 1196 (1977); Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 137
(1976) ("Federal Common Law of Nuisance As Basis For Relief In Environmental Pollution
Cases').
139 See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 101 S. Ct. 2870 (1981) ("The desirability of
uniform interpretation . . . cannot support exclusive federal jurisdiction over claims whose
governing rules are borrowed from state law. There is no need for uniform interpretation of
laws that vary from State to State'). See note 10 supra.
140 101 S.Ct. 1784 (1981).
141 The determination of what state's common law is applicable to a particular dispute
may, of course, raise problems. These problems, however, can be accommodated in the same
manner as any other Erie conflict-of-laws dispute. Cf Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp.,
101 S.Ct. 2870 (1981) ("State courts routinely exercise subject matter jurisdiction over civil
cases arising from events in other States and governed by the other States' laws"); Gindler,
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scale examination of the standards of liability which will be imposed
under state law upon various parties for hazardous waste disposal
activity is beyond the scope of this article. 142 State courts have im-
posed liability for hazardous waste disposal conduct under theories of
negligence, 143 nuisance' 44 and strict liability. 45 In various factual
settings, courts have imposed 46 or refused to impose 47 liability upon
owners or operators of hazardous waste disposal sites. Some courts
have permitted parties to escape liability by delegating duties to in-
dependent third-parties. 148 Other courts have rejected this de-
fense.' 49 In addition, a few courts have declared that significant
hazardous waste disposal activity is so inherently dangerous that the
imposition of strict liability is appropriate. 50
These decisions cannot be reconciled into a nationally consistent
standard for determining liability for hazardous waste disposal con-
duct. The policy questions raised in hazardous waste disposal cases
are complex, and often involve interests of parties who are not before
the court.' 5 ' The decisions turn upon environmental, legal, social
Water Pollution and Quality Controls in 3 WATER & WATER RIGHTS § 210.1 at 38 (R. Clark ed.
1967); Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1439, 1449 n.37
(1972) ("The states' lack of competence to apportion interstate waters can hardly be genera-
lized as a lack of competence to regulate the quality of interstate waters. In interstate nui-
sance cases brought in diversity litigation, it is clear that state law will apply.").
142 See Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statuto,7 Remedies For Hazardous Waste Injuries,
12 RuTGERS L.J. 117 (1980); Comment, Love Canal" Common Law Approaches to a Modern Trag-
edy, 11 ENVT'L L. 133 (1981).
143 See, e.g., Iverson v. Vint, 243 Iowa 949, 54 N.W.2d 494 (1952).
144 See, e.g., Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (Ct. App. 1978), cert.
denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979). See also Note, Hazardous Wastes: Preserving the Nuisance Rem-
edy, 33 STAN. L. REv. 675 (1981); Comment, A Private Nuisance Approach to Hazardous Waste
DisposalSites, 7 OHIo N. U.L. REV. 86 (1980).
145 See, e.g., City of Bridgeton v. B.P. Oil Co., 146 NJ. Super. 169, 369 A.2d 49 (1976); see
also Note, Allocating the Costs of Haardour Waste Disposal, 94 HARv. L. REV. 584 (1981); Note,
Strict Liabilityfor Generators, Transporters and Diposers ofHaardoas Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REv. 949
(1981).
146 See, e.g., State v. Ventron Corp., No. C-2996-75 (N.J. Super. Ct., Chan. Div. Aug. 27,
1979); Meadowlark Farms, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control, 17 Ill. App. 3d 881, 208 N.E.2d
829 (1974).
147 See, e.g., State v. Exxon Corp., 151 N.J. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977); Tennessee
Coal Iron & R. v. Hortiline, 224 Ala. 116, 11 So. 2d 833 (1943).
148 See, e.g., McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas Co., 225 Or. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 427B (1977).
149 See, e.g., Ewell v. Petrol Processors, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 366
So. 2d 575 (La. 1979).
150 See note 145 supra. But see Ewell v. Petrol Processors, Inc., 364 So. 2d 604 (Ct. App.
1978), cert. denied, 366 So. 2d 575 (La. 1979); Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 279 Or. 3, 566 P.2d
175 (1977); Boroughs v. Joiner, 337 So. 2d 340 (Ala. 1976).
151 See Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. Rsv. 1439, 1453
[Vol. 57:260]
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
and economic concerns which are both general and parochial. Many
states have environmental statutes which justify imposing liability
standards for hazardous waste disposal activity which may in some
respects be far more punitive than any imposed under the federal
common law. 152 Other states have found common law rights or du-
ties which would drastically reduce the burdens which would have
been applied to a party subject to liability under the federal common
law. 
153
At this time, it cannot be determined how such non-Superfund
hazardous waste disposal issues will ultimately be determined under
state common law and statutory principles, and whether such deter-
minations will result in consistent liability findings. Despite this un-
certainty, however, it is the states which are the ultimate definers and
protectors of their citizens' rights. 54 Where Congress has decided
not to act in regard to private hazardous waste causes of action, it is
for state statutes and state common law doctrines to resolve questions
concerning liability for hazardous waste disposal activity.155 It is
(1972) (in environmental cases "the interests are too diverse and numerous to be represented
in court at the same time').
152 See notes 3 & 115 supra; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.011-21 (West Gum. Supp.
1981). Many states have what may be called general criminal statutes which, while never
previously applied in the environmental context, may provide a basis for more stringent state
standards. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(1)(B) with N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45 (McKinney
1980) (criminal nuisance) and N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.24 (McKinney 1980) (reckless
endangerment).
153 See, e.g., Department of Envt'l Quality v. Chemical Waste Storage & Disposition, Inc.,
19 Or. App. 712, 719, 528 P.2d 1076, 1081 (1974); Curry Coal v. Arnoni, 439 Pa. 114, 119-20,
266 A.2d 678, 681 (1970); Fritz v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 45 Del. 427, 437-38, 75
A.2d 256, 261 (1950); Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, S.W.2d 221 (1936). Compare
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B, Comment d (1977) with W. PROSSER, TORTS
§ 88 (4th ed. 1971). In addition, of course, state applications of other common law concepts
could result in victims of hazardous waste disposal activity being denied compensation. Cf
Note, Liabiliy For Generators of Hazardous Waste.: The Failure of Existing Enforcement Mechanisms,
69 GEO. LJ. 1015, 1063 (1981) (three of the six Restatement criteria tend to favor the defend-
ant in a strict liability action for improper hazardous disposal).
154 See Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law.'" Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); McRae, The Development of
Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 27, 37 (1948); see generally W. PROSSER,
TORTS § 3 (4th ed. 1971).
155 See note 103 supra; see generaly Stewart, Pyramids of Szcrtne? Problems of Federalism In
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Polioy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1219-20
(1977) (uniform federal environmental programs impose unnecessary or excessive economic
and social costs on some areas); Comment, Preemption Doctrne in the Environmental Context, 127
U. PA. L. REv. 197, 213 (1978) (each area of the country has its own particular needs and
priorities which require a diversity of regulation); Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation
and The Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1762, 1763 (1974) (states can be flexible in formu-
lating standards best suited to the needs of the state and its citizens). But see Note, Federal
Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1452-53 (1972):
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only in this way that liability problems which Congress has decided
were not appropriate for resolution under federal law can be resolved
in accordance with the laws and policies of the parties who are most
directly affected by these activities.
1 56
VII. Conclusion
The federal common law was beginning to provide a means of
circumventing the difficulties of implementing federal statutory en-
forcement schemes in hazardous waste disposal activity. 57 It is
somewhat anomalous that Congress, by enacting Superfund, de-
prived claimants of federal common law remedies which would al-
most certainly have been available to them but for the enactment of
this statute.' 58 Superfund, however, was a congressional compromise
in the area of hazardous waste control. Just as it deprived claimants
of their ability to rely upon federal common law doctrines to impose
liability for hazardous waste disposal conduct, it also deprived cer-
tain defendants of federal common law defenses which might other-
wise have been available to them.
In essence, Superfund has complicated hazardous waste litiga-
Case-by-case adjudication is fundamentally inadequate to consider and weigh
properly the many and varied interests environmental standards must reflect and
thus to contribute to the type of comprehensive planning necessary for environmen-
tal control. . . courts will merely apply the analytical touchstones of the common
law, such as reasonableness and fault, on a case-by-case, without formulating them
with the specificity and complexity requisite for comprehensive lawmaking in the
environmental area.
156 Solid waste disposal activity is traditionally a matter of purely local concern. See 122
CONG. REC. S11,071 (daily ed. June 30, 1976) ("solid waste is a problem best dealt with by
local and State governments") (remarks of Sen. Stafford); id. at S 11,072 ("solid waste man-
agement should be primarily a state and local concern') (remarks of Sen. Baker); note 98
supra.
Once the direct liability provisions of Superfund are given effect, see notes 115-23 supra,
questions concerning the standard of civil liability to be imposed upon private parties impli-
cate no significant federal concerns. See Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution; Statutog
Pre-emption or Preseraation?, 49 FORD. L. REv. 500, 522 (1981) ("The question whether private
parties may obtain damages involves the federal interest only insofar as it might be thought to
advance indirectly pollution control. The federal interest in a damage action, however, is so
remote and speculative that no significant conflict exists and use of state law is appropriate.").
157 See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv., 496 F. Supp. 1127 (D. Conn. 1980).
158 Middlesex County v. National Sea Clammers, 101 S. Ct. 2615 (1981). As Justice Ste-
vens said in dissent:
The net effect of the Court's analysis of the legislative intent is therefore a conclu-
sion that Congress, by enacting the Clean Water Act and the MPRSA, deliberately
deprived respondents of effective federal remedies that would otherwise have been
available to them. In my judgment, the language of both statutes, as well as their
legislative history, belies this improbable conclusion.
Id. at 2630. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tion by (1) setting ambiguous prospective standards, (2) requiring
analysis of all formerly applicable state and federal standards to de-
termine the constitutionality of any retrospective application of these
new standards, and (3) making non-Superfund claims subject to
state, rather than federal, rules of decision. There are, however,
means by which the federal courts can minimize these complica-
tions. 159 Even more importantly, such complications will arise only
in the effort to ensure a fair application of appropriate standards to
those subject to the act and to ensure that these standards are deter-
mined in compliance with the laws which the jurisdictions most
closely affected by this conduct have chosen to apply.160 Complica-
tions such as these are precisely what our federal system was designed
to preserve, not to eliminate.
159 For example, federal courts in non-diversity cases could refuse to entertain state law
claims not properly before the court. See United States v. Town of North Hempstead, 610
F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1979). Cf United States v. Cargill, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1981)
(staying federal Clean Water Act proceeding pending resolution of related state matter);
Mabray v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 480 F. Supp. 1240 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) (refusing to permit
federal question removal of private hazardous waste damage action).
160 See note 154 supra.
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